Reciprocity With Unequal Payoffs: Cooperative and Uncooperative Interactions Affect Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion by Suarez, Carla Jordão et al.
Digital Commons @ Assumption University 
Psychology Department Faculty Works Psychology Department 
2021 
Reciprocity With Unequal Payoffs: Cooperative and Uncooperative 
Interactions Affect Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion 
Carla Jordão Suarez 
University of São Paulo 
Marcelo Frota Benvenuti 
University of São Paulo 
Kalliu Carvalho Couto 
Oslo Metropolitan University 
José Oliveira Siqueira 
University of São Paulo 
Josele Abreu-Rodrigues 
University of Brasília 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/psychology-faculty 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Suarez, C. J.; Benvenuti, M. F. ; Couto, K. C. ; Siqueira, J. O. ; Abreu-Rodrigues, J.; Lionello-DeNolf, K. M. ; 
and Sandaker, I. (2021). Reciprocity With Unequal Payoffs: Cooperative and Uncooperative Interactions 
Affect Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion. Frontiers in Psychology 12: 628425. https://doi.org/10.3389/
fpsyg.2021.628425 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at Digital Commons @ 
Assumption University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Department Faculty Works by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Assumption University. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@assumption.edu. 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Digital Commons @ Assumption College
Authors 
Carla Jordão Suarez, Marcelo Frota Benvenuti, Kalliu Carvalho Couto, José Oliveira Siqueira, Josele Abreu-
Rodrigues, Karen M. Lionello-DeNolf, and Ingunn Sandaker 
This article is available at Digital Commons @ Assumption University: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/
psychology-faculty/27 
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 02 July 2021
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.628425














This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 11 November 2020
Accepted: 07 June 2021
Published: 02 July 2021
Citation:
Suarez CJ, Benvenuti MF, Couto KC,
Siqueira JO, Abreu-Rodrigues J,
Lionello-DeNolf KM and Sandaker I










Carla Jordão Suarez 1,2, Marcelo Frota Benvenuti 1,2, Kalliu Carvalho Couto 3*,
José Oliveira Siqueira 1, Josele Abreu-Rodrigues 4, Karen M. Lionello-DeNolf 5 and
Ingunn Sandaker 3
1Department of Experimental Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil, 2National
Institute of Science and Technology about Cognition, Behavior and Teaching, São Carlos, Brazil, 3 Faculty of Health Sciences,
Department of Behavioural Sciences, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo, Norway, 4Department of Basic Psychological
Processes, University of Brasília, Brasília, Brazil, 5Department of Psychology, Assumption University, Worcester, MA,
United States
Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve through reciprocity. Reciprocal
cooperation is the process in which lasting social interactions provide the opportunity to
learn about others’ behavior, and to further predict the outcome of future encounters.
Lasting social interactions may also decrease aversion to unequal distribution of
gains – when individuals accept inequity payoffs knowing about the possibility of future
encounters. Thus, reciprocal cooperation and aversion to inequity can be complementary
phenomena. The present study investigated the effects of cooperative and uncooperative
interactions on participants’ aversion to disadvantageous inequity. Participants played an
experimental task in the presence of a confederate who acted as a second participant.
In reality, the participant interacted with a computer programed to make cooperative and
uncooperative choices. After interacting with a cooperative or uncooperative computer,
participants chose between blue cards to produce larger gains to the computer and
smaller for him/her or green cards to produce equal and smaller gains for both. Results
confirmed our first hypothesis that uncooperative interactions would produce aversion
to disadvantageous inequity. Lastly, half of the participants were informed that points
received during the experiment could be later exchanged for money, and half were not.
Results indicated that information about monetary outcomes did not affect aversion to
inequity, contradicting our second hypothesis. We discuss these results in the light of
theories of reciprocal cooperation, inequity aversion, and conformity.
Keywords: inequity aversion, reciprocity, cooperation, learning, points vs. money
INTRODUCTION
To explain the ways in which cooperation can evolve among unrelated individuals, Trives (1971)
proposed the notion of reciprocity. Trives defined reciprocity as one individual providing helpful
acts toward another individual who can provide benefits in return at a later time. Nowak
and Highfield (2012) presented several theoretical models in which cooperation can evolve
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when reciprocity occurs (for review, see Nowak, 2006 and
Rand and Nowak, 2013). Szolnoki and Perc (2015) discussed
how conformity (i.e., choosing the most common strategy
within a group) can increase reciprocity in social dilemmas
and consequently affect cooperation. Also, several behavioral
experiments have shown characteristics and variables that affect
reciprocity. For example, children and adults cooperate more
when playing with the same partner multiple times (e.g., Dal
Bó, 2005; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011; Blake et al., 2015b).
Children exhibited higher degrees of reciprocity when exposed
to cooperative puppets in a pretest condition (Vaish et al., 2018).
Adults made larger donations after interacting with cooperative
confederates (Smith et al., 2017). Children and adolescents
used cooperative strategies when playing with a cooperative
confederate (Keil et al., 2017). Adults’ reciprocal responses in
a puzzle game were modulated by confederates’ percentage of
cooperative plays (e.g., Ribes-Iñesta et al., 2010; Avalos et al.,
2015). In a prisoner’s dilemma game, adults cooperated when
the probability of reciprocity was high between the dyad (e.g.,
Silverstein et al., 1998; Baker and Rachlin, 2001).
A key aspect in cooperation by reciprocity is the probability
of future interactions (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod,
1984). In this sense, experimental studies on reciprocity
using within-subjects designs may be useful in exploring
how such mechanisms interact with learning principles and
produce cumulative changes in an individual’s cooperative
behavior (Rachlin, 2019). Studies that investigate how reciprocity
may change due to learned mechanisms are important for
understanding the variability and idiosyncrasies of participants’
choices and their contextual modulation. Thus, reciprocity
strategies may be also interpreted from the perspective of basic
principles of learning considering the ways in which socially
mediated reinforcement influences past, present, and future
reciprocal behavior (Schmitt, 1998; Baker and Rachlin, 2001;
Rachlin et al., 2001).
Payoffs distributions between participants may vary in most
social exchanges. Sometimes, unequal distribution may be
experienced as aversive (Oberliessen and Kalenscher, 2019). In
fact, behavioral studies about unequal payoffs with non-humans
(Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), babies (Schmidt and Sommerville,
2011), children (LoBue et al., 2011), adolescents (Blake et al.,
2014, 2015a), and adults (Bone and Raihani, 2015) have shown
that humans and non-humans may refuse to accept unequal
distributions of gain. Ferh and Schmidt (1999) and Brosnan
(2011) suggested that aversion to inequity and cooperation
are intertwined processes, in which individuals discriminate
when a partner received unfairly benefits from social exchanges
and uses such information for future interactions. Consistent
with this, Perc (2000) and Perc and Szolnoki (2008) observed
that the distribution of wealth (i.e., distribution of unequal
outcomes) plays a crucial role in the evolution of cooperation
among unrelated individuals. Also, Hauser et al. (2019) argued
that extreme payoff inequity prevents cooperation. However, if
individuals differ in productivity, inequality may be necessary
Abbreviations: AI, Advantageous Inequity; DI, Disadvantageous Inequity; CI,
Cooperative Interaction; UI, Uncooperative Interaction.
and tolerated for cooperation to prevail. Individuals who
cooperate for extended periods of time may manipulate payoff
distributions, further effecting inequity either toward or away
from a fair distribution. Perc (2000), Perc and Szolnoki (2008),
and Hauser et al. (2019) are consistent with the proposition that
unequal distributions are not always seen as unfair (Starmans
et al., 2017). Therefore, aversion to inequity should be studied as
another evolutionary process that occurs at the group level and
over extended periods of time (i.e., altruism; Wilson and Wilson,
2007).
Two types of inequity aversion have been described in the
literature: aversion to advantageous inequity (AI) and aversion
to disadvantageous inequity (DI). The latter refers to aversion
to unequal and unfavorable payoffs, and the former refers
to aversion to unequal and favorable payoffs (e.g., Blake and
McAuliffe, 2011; McAuliffe et al., 2013, 2017). Studies of aversion
to inequity often employ an unequal distribution of outcomes
to perform a common task and examine an individual’s refusal
to accept unequal gains as the dependent variable (Ferh and
Schmidt, 1999; Ahmed and Karlapalem, 2014; Brosnan and de
Waal, 2014; Blake et al., 2015a). Overall, studies of inequity
aversion have used tangible rewards as dependent variables for
both humans and non-human participants. Such studies may
use candy or stickers to study aversion to inequity in children
(Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; LoBue et al., 2011; Shaw and
Olson, 2013; Blake et al., 2014; Corbit et al., 2017), money in
studies with adults (Schmitt and Marwell, 1971a,b; Schmitt and
Marwell, 1972; Shimoff and Matthews, 1975), and cucumbers
and grapes in studies with monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal,
2003). Blake and Rand (2010) showed that reward value affects
children’s donations to other children. The amount donated by
the children was inversely proportional to the value of the reward
for them; that is, children preferentially donated their non-
preferred stickers and rarely donated their favorite stickers. In the
present study, one of our aims was to investigate the role of the
nature of outcomes over inequity aversion (inform participants
or not that earned points were exchangeable for money) in a
between-subject design.
Aversion to inequity may be affected by the nature of
outcomes. However, cooperative interactions also modulate
whether individuals perceive inequal distribution as aversive
(e.g., Silverstein et al., 1998; Avalos et al., 2015; Corbit et al.,
2017; Benvenuti et al., 2020). Corbit et al. (2017), for example,
investigated the effects of a prior cooperative interaction on
inequity aversion in dyads of children in India and Canada.
In the pretest condition, the dyads worked on a cooperative
task, in which both children had to simultaneously pull a
rope to move a container with candies or stickers, or on an
individual task, in which each child individually pulled the rope.
In the test condition, the participants played an Inequity Game
that evaluated their aversion to AI and DI. The children sat
opposite each other, and the obtained rewards were individually
or cooperatively distributed by the experimenter. One child
in each dyad was selected to choose a green lever to accept
the distribution or a red lever to refuse it. If the distribution
was refused, then neither child in the dyad would receive the
rewards. The dyads were randomly distributed into four groups:
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Cooperative Task and AI, Cooperative Task and DI, Individual
Task and AI, and Individual Task and DI. Children from both
India and Canada exhibited aversion to AI after being exposed
to the cooperative task but not to the individual task. The
children refused disadvantageous distribution regardless of the
training task (i.e., cooperative or individual). These and other
results suggest that aversion to AI can be modulated by social
interactions and cultural context, whereas DI is less sensitive
to this (e.g., Adams, 1965; Ferh and Schmidt, 1999; Takagishi
et al., 2010; Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2014, 2015a;
McAuliffe et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018). The results produced
by Corbit et al. (2017) suggest that cooperation modulates AI
aversion but has no effect on DI aversion. As reciprocity is known
to have a strong effect on participants’ choices to cooperate
(e.g., Schmid et al., 2021), we investigated whether cooperative
and uncooperative interactions involving reciprocity would affect
aversion to DI. The elucidation of the connection between
reciprocity and aversion toDImay represent a novel contribution
to the understanding of the evolution of cooperation at large.
In the present study, we explicitly investigated how
cooperation by reciprocity affects college students’ decisions to
accept or refuse unequal disadvantageous gains. We examined
whether cooperative and uncooperative interaction between
two individuals would influence participants’ willingness
to produce or refuse disadvantageous inequity. To do so,
we arranged experimental conditions in which the “other
participant” (i.e., programed computer) worked cooperatively
or uncooperatively in a situation that potentially produced
greater gains for the participant (i.e., advantageous inequity
for the participant). Next, participants were exposed to a
test condition, where the computer could maximize gains if
the participant behaved cooperatively or earn fewer points if
the participant did not cooperate. Participants uncooperative
responses in test conditions were defined as disadvantageous
inequity aversion, that is, participants refused unequal and
disadvantageous gains. We aimed at investigating whether (i)
interactions with a cooperative computer would affect reciprocal
cooperation in test conditions and whether (ii) interactions with
an uncooperative computer would produce disadvantageous
inequity. This experimental procedure was implemented with
participants who were informed that points would be exchanged
for money by the end of the experiment and participants who
were not informed. Information about money exchange was
used to evaluate a third research question, whether (iii) the value
of reinforcers for cooperating influenced reciprocal cooperation
and aversion to inequity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-three university students (26 women and 17 men), 18–
29 years of age, participated in the experiment. The participants
were undergraduate students in the following majors: civil and
electrical engineering, physics, psychology, and administration.
Although participants were asked not to talk about the
experiment, we had no control over whether they followed
the instruction or whether they knew each other. All of
FIGURE 1 | An overhead depiction of the experimental setting, including the
table and chairs disposition in the experimental room, as well as the position
where the confederate, the participant and the experimenter remained
throughout the experiment.
the participants signed an informed consent form that was
approved by the ethics committee of the University of São
Paulo. Experimental procedures, including instructions given
to participants, were also approved by the ethics committee
(CAAE protocol: 64336716.4.0000.5561). The participants were
informed that they would perform the task as part of a dyad,
but the choices were actually made by a computer program. To
simulate the participation of the other participant, a confederate
remained in the experimental room throughout data collection,
making some noises, such as dragging the chair and writing on
paper when necessary.
Settings and Materials
Experimental sessions occurred at the University of São Paulo,
São Paulo, Brazil. The sessions were conducted in a room (25 m2;
Figure 1) that contained four desks, three chairs, a folding wall
partition, two computer notebook computers (Samsung FR511,
Intel i7-2670QM, Windows 7 Professional 64-bit operating
system), a mouse, and a headset. When the participant entered
the room, the confederate was already seated in one of the
chairs, as shown in Figure 1. The participant and confederate
were seated side-by-side, separated by the wall partition such
that eye contact between them was not possible. One computer
was placed on the table in front of the participant. The other
computer was placed on a table located directly behind the
participant and confederate. In order to mask extraneous room
noise, a white sound was played on the participant’s headset.
The Interdependent Response and Consequence Programming
software (ProgRCI) displayed the task, recorded the participant’s
responses, and simulated the other participant’s choice, which
will be described along with the paper as computer’s choices.
Experimental Task
The experimental task of this study was similar to that presented
by Benvenuti et al. (2020). In each trial, two sets of two virtual
cards (blue and green) were displayed on the participant’s
computer screen. One set represented the participants’ cards,
and the other set represented the computer’s cards. In each trial,
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the participants were asked to choose between a green or blue
card. Figure 2 shows all screens that were displayed during the
experimental session.
The first screen presented a summary of the instructions
(Figure 2A). The participants were asked to click on the
yellow circle to move to the next screen. The second screen
showed the matrix of points that were in effect for the current
experimental condition (Figure 2B). Thereafter, the participants
were instructed to press the yellow button again to start the
task. The task screen (Figure 2C) showed the virtual cards and
payoff matrix, which depicted the point outcomes for each card
combination for that trial. After the participants clicked on one
of the chosen cards (i.e., blue or green), the points that were
gained during the trials accumulated in a point counter that was
located at the top left of the screen and the color combination
of each trial displayed the card chosen by the participant and
the computer program (Figure 2C). At the end of each trial
was a 1-s intertrial interval, during which the screen became
entirely white. The computer cursor was placed back in the
middle of the screen at the start of each trial, ensuring that the
participants actively made a new choice in every trial. At the
end of each condition, a screen that showed the choices that
were made by the participants and computer program and points
that were received were displayed (Figure 2D). Then, a screen
with a matrix of points corresponding to the new condition was
presented and followed by the screens described above. At the
end of the session, a final screen showed the number of points
gained in the previous condition as well as the total number of
points obtained in the experiment. It also asked the participant to
call the experimenter (Figure 2E).
Procedure
When entering the room, the participant was greeted by the
experimenter and invited to sit in one of two chairs. By that time,
the confederate was waiting in the experimental room, sitting
in the second chair. From their chair, the participant had visual
access to the notebook to be used to perform the task, located
in front of his/her chair and to the notebook for instructions
(NFI) positioned at his/her back (Figure 1). A simulation that
used the NFI explained the payoff matrix before beginning
the experimental session. The experimenter first informed the
participant that he/she would be Participant 1 throughout the
experiment and that the “other participant” (i.e., computer
program) would be Participant 2. The experimenter showed one
example of a matrix of points on the screen of the NFI and orally
explained how to perform the experimental task (i.e., choose one
of the cards and click on it). The experimenter also emphasized
that the number of points that were received would depend on
the color combination that is produced by Participant 1 and
Participant 2. A simulation was then performed to verify that the
task and the matrix were understood by the participant.
Simulation Trials
Four trials with alternating different types of choices were
simulated, such that all color combinations were presented. At
the end of each simulated trial, the experimenter asked the
participant to write on paper howmany points they would receive
for each color combination. For example, in the first trial, the
experimenter said, “Let us assume that Participant 1 chose the
blue card and Participant 2 chose the green card. With this color
combination, howmany points would each of you receive? Please
do not speak out loud. Write your answer on the paper and I will
go to your desk to check it out.” If the participant’s answer was
incorrect in any of the simulation trials, then the experimenter
would explain the matrix of points again and moved on to
another type of trial.
Instruction
After the simulated trials, the experimenter gave the written
general instructions and asked to read it silently. The instructions
were the following (translated from Portuguese):
“Hello Participant. Thank you for participating in this
research project! This study is not about intelligence or emotions.
You will be working with a partner, and both of you will have
an identical task to perform during the experiment. You and
your partner must choose between two cards (one blue and one
green). In each trial, you will receive a certain number of points.
The number of points you will receive depends on your choice
and your partner’s choice. The matrix of points that will appear
to you is the same as the one that will appear to the other
participant. Please remain seated and do not talk to your partner
or experimenter during the session. If you have any questions
or if you need to ask a question, then raise one hand, and the
experimenter will come to you. Once the experiment is over,
the following message will appear: “Thank you very much for
participating! Please call the experimenter!” When this message
appears, raise one of your hands, and the experimenter will come
to you. Put on the headset that is lying on your desk and start
the task.”
After handing over the paper with instructions to the
participant and the confederate, the experimenter asked them
to put on the headset and start the experimental session. At the
end of the session, the experimenter asked the participant and
the confederate to complete a questionnaire with two questions:
The first question was: Why did you choose the blue or green
card? You can check more than one alternative if necessary. To
answer this question, the participant and the confederate had
to choose one of the following alternatives: (a) To receive more
points than the other participant; (b) It depended on the choice
of the other participant; (c) To keep the same score between the
two participants; (d) None of the previous alternatives (please,
explain your answer). The second question was: In your opinion,
why did the other participant choose the blue or green card? You
can checkmore than one alternative if necessary. The alternatives
were: (a) To receive more points than me; (b) It depended on my
choice; (c) To keep the score equal between you and him/her; (d)
None of the previous alternatives (please, explain your answer).
If the participant chose the letter (d) for any of the questions
and wrote that the other player was not a real participant but the
computer, his/her data were not analyzed. If the participant did
not explain why he/she chose the letter d, the experimenter asked
what he/she thought and wrote it down on the paper. None of the
participants who met the criteria to participate in the experiment
chose letter “d” in the post-experimental questionnaire.
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FIGURE 2 | Screens shown during the experimental session. (A) Presented a summary of the instructions. (B) Presented the payoff matrix. Only the payoff matrix
used in the cooperative interaction and uncooperative interaction condition is presented. (C) Presented the experimental task. (D) Presented a matrix of points
corresponding to the new condition. (E) Presented a final screen showed the number of points gained in the previous condition as well as the total number of points
obtained in the experiment.
Experimental Conditions
All participants were exposed to three experimental conditions:
equity, cooperative interaction, or uncooperative interaction, and
disadvantageous inequity test. There were three payoff matrices
that differed in terms of the distribution of points between the
participant and the computer when the blue-blue combination
occurred (see Table 1). Each condition consisted of 16 trials.
Equity
The blue-blue color combination resulted in 100 points for the
participant and the computer. Any other combination resulted
in 20 points for both. The computer was programmed to choose
the blue card 12 times and to choose the green card four times
at random. In this condition, the participant and the computer
always received the same number of points.
Cooperative Interaction (CI)
The blue-blue combination resulted in 100 points for the
participant and 20 points for the computer. The remaining
possible combinations resulted in 20 points for the participant
and 20 points for the computer. In this condition, the computer
was programmed to choose only the blue card. With that,
participants were able to receive 100 by choosing the blue
card, in which case the computer received 20 points. This
computer program was considered cooperative as choices
favored participants earns.
Uncooperative Interaction (UI)
As with the condition described above, the participant received
100 points with the blue-blue combination. However, the
computer was programmed to choose the green card on all
trials. Thus, regardless of the participant’s choice, equity in
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TABLE 1 | Points received by the participant and the computer with each card color combination and the number of trials in each condition.
Condition Color combination Points Number of trials
Participant Computer
Equity Blue Blue 100 100 16
Any other 20 20
Cooperative interaction Blue Blue 100 20
Uncooperative interaction Any other 20 20
Disadvantageous Inequity Blue Blue 20 100
Any other 20 20
the distribution of points was the only possible outcome. The
computer choice did not allow participants to earn 100 points on
any trial, thus defined as uncooperative.
Disadvantageous Inequity Test (DI – Test)
The blue-blue combination resulted in 20 points for the
participant and 100 points for the computer. The other three
possible combinations resulted in 20 points for the participant
and 20 points for the computer. The computer was programmed
to choose the blue card on every trial. This condition followed
both CI and UI. Participants choice of green card did not allow
the computer to receive 100 points, and thus defined aversion to
inequity.
All participants were exposed to the four conditions described
above; however, they were assigned to one of two sets of
experimental instructions. The instructions for half of the
participants did not mention that points earned during the
experimental task would be later exchangeable for money.
The instructions for the other half of the participants had
an additional sentence stating that points earned during the
experiment would be later exchanged for money. The sentence
was written as follows (translated from Portuguese): “The points
you receive will be exchanged for money at the end of the
experimental session.” Regardless of how many points the
participants earned in the experiment, everyone received R$10
(∼USD$2.50) to reimburse transportation costs.
Experimental Design
Participants were exposed to a mixed design (Johnston
and Pennypacker, 2009) in which one of the independent
variables – cooperative or uncooperative interaction – was
manipulated within-subjects, and the other independent variable
– payoff nature (i.e., points and money) – was manipulated
between subjects.
All recruited participants (n = 43) were exposed initially
to the equity condition such that their choices could be
observed in a situation in which all card combinations
produced equal outcomes, but a blue-blue combination
produced a better outcome for both. If the participant
did not choose the blue card in at least 12 of 16 trials,
his/her results were not included in the data analysis.
In total, 40 participants met this criterion. We assessed
possible effects of the order of the experimental conditions,
so 20 participants were exposed to the following order
of experimental conditions: Cooperative Interaction (CI),
Disadvantageous Inequity Test (DI-Test), Uncooperative
Interaction (UI), and lastly, Disadvantageous Inequity Test
(DI-Test). The other 20 participants reverse order: UI, DI-Test,
CI, and DI-Test. The rationale for this design was to observe
participants’ choices in DI-Test conditions after interactions
in which the computer was programmed to be cooperative
or uncooperative with the participant. Figure 3 represents
a flowchart of experimental design and conditions order
of exposure.
As we show in Figure 3, after receiving or not information
that points would be exchanged for money (left hexagon
and rectangle), participants responded to the equity condition
(center circles). Thereafter, participants responded to one of the
sequences of the conditions (rectangle on the right).
The experimental design illustrated in Figure 3was planned to
investigate whether (1) a history of cooperative or uncooperative
interaction would affect aversion to inequity differently, whether
(2) this influence depends on the order in which UI and
CI conditions were presented, and whether (3) aversion to
disadvantageous inequity is modulated by the information
that points would be later exchanged for money. Our
hypotheses were:
Hypothesis 1. Several studies (e.g., Corbit et al., 2017;
McAuliffe et al., 2017) have suggested that DI aversion is less
sensitive to social interactions and cultural context than AI
aversion. On the other hand, the literature on cooperation
shows that it is strongly affected by reciprocal interactions
(Silverstein et al., 1998; Baker and Rachlin, 2001). The main
hypothesis of the present study is that participants’ choices
during a DI-Test will be affected by reciprocal cooperation.
That is, CI will decrease, and UI will increase, aversion to
DI during a subsequent DI-Test condition. We tested this
hypothesis bymanipulating CI andUI interactions and testing
DI aversion in a within-subjects design (see Figure 3).
Hypothesis 2. A diversity of rewards (tangible and non-
tangibles) has been used in studies investigating the
connection between DI and cooperation in non-humans,
adults, and children (e.g., Blake and Rand, 2010; Blake et al.,
2014; Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). We tested whether or not
receiving information that earned points would be exchanged
for money affected levels of aversion to inequity in a DI-Test
in a between-subjects design (see Figure 3). In this hypothesis,
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FIGURE 3 | Flowchart of experimental design and conditions order of exposure. Experimental design consisted of a within group design, in which half of the
participants (n = 20) received information that points would be exchanged for money and the other half (n = 20) did not (left hexagon and rectangle), and
within-subject design as participants from both groups were exposed to cooperative and uncooperative interaction in different orders.
we predicted that participants would show higher levels of
aversion to inequity when receiving information about the
points’ monetary value.
Data Analysis
During DI-Test conditions, Participants choices of blue cards
allowed the computer to earn more points, and choices of green
card prevented the computer from earning more points. Thus,
the proportion of blue-card choices was used as a measure of
DI aversion. A within-subjects design was employed to evaluate
participants’ proportion of blue-card choices after interacting
with a cooperative and uncooperative computer (hypothesis
1). The effects of receiving information about the nature of
outcomes (money or points) was evaluated in a between-
subjects design (hypothesis 2). We used IBM SPSS Statistics
26 to perform a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM)
with procedure GENLINMIXED. The dependent variable is the
dichotomous nominal variable of the participants’ choice of a
blue or green card, with green as the reference category. We used
the binomial distribution and logistics link function resulting
in a repeated measure binary logistic regression model. The
participant identification variable was modeled as a random
effect. The fixedmain effects are the card choices by the computer
programming during cooperative and uncooperative conditions
and the participant’s choice of cards in DI-Test conditions.
The fixed interaction effect is composed of the programming
variables of the computer card choice and the conditions of
the experiment (order of interactions and information about
monetary outcome). The significance level used in each null
hypothesis test was 5% (see Appendices A and B for raw data).
RESULTS
The present study evaluated participants’ choices in the DI-
Test conditions after interactions with a cooperative and
uncooperative computer. A GLMM omnibus test was used
to assess hypothesis 1. The results from the fixed-effect
test accounting for the variables information about monetary
outcomes and DI-Test conditions showed a significant difference
(F(3,1272) = 8.203, p < 0.001) between proportion of blue-card
choices after interaction with a cooperative and uncooperative
computer. This result confirms hypothesis 1 – participants
showed higher proportions of reciprocity after cooperative
interactions. Figure 4A depicts the proportion of blue-card
choices in the DI-Tests after cooperative and uncooperative
interactions separately for the participants who received
information about money and those who did not. This figure
shows that choices of blue cards were substantially higher in the
DI-Test following the CI interaction than the UI interaction.
The within-subjects design employed to evaluate hypothesis 1
allowed testing to determine whether the order of presentation
of cooperative and uncooperative interactions differentially
affected DI aversion. The post-hoc analysis revealed no
significant difference between the proportion of blue-card
choices when accounting for order of presentation of cooperative
and uncooperative interactions. Regardless of whether the
participants were informed about monetary outcomes, there was
an overlap of <25% in the confidence intervals, with t(1272)
= −8.74, adjusted p < 0.001 and t(1,272) = −3.50, adjusted
p = 0.002. This post-hoc pairwise analysis revealed reciprocal
cooperation after interacting with a cooperative computer
and aversion to DI after interacting with an uncooperative
computer was not affected by presentation order. Figure 4B
shows the estimated marginal means for proportion blue-card
choices in DI-Test conditions for participants exposed first
in the uncooperative interaction and then in the cooperative
interaction, and for the participants exposed first to the
cooperative interaction and then to the uncooperative interaction
at corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
A second post-hoc analysis was carried out to evaluate
hypothesis 2 – whether receiving information on the monetary
outcomes would affect participants’ reciprocity under DI-Test
conditions. The results of these post-hoc tests revelead a
significant effect of cooperative and uncooperative interaction on
reciprocity, when not considering information about monetary
outcome (money group: F(3,1272) = 983, p < 0.001; points group:
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FIGURE 4 | Estimated marginal means of participant’s blue cards choices under disadvantageous inequity test conditions as a function of previews interactions with
cooperative and uncooperative computer. (A) Depicts participants aggregated data for proportion of blue choices, showing that computer choices prior to DI-Test
directly affected participants’ choices. (B) Depicts participants proportion of choices of blue card in each DI-Test, showing that prior interactions directly affected
participants’ choices in DI-Test conditions regardless of the order of exposition.
FIGURE 5 | Estimated marginal means of participant’s blue cards choices
under disadvantageous inequity test conditions as a function of the
information about monetary outcomes.
F(3,1272) = 33, p < 0.001). However, the post-hoc analysis showed
no statistically significant difference in the proportion of blue-
card choices when considering information about monetary
outcome (F(1,1272) = 1.029, p = 0.295). Thus, the conclusion
is that the monetary outcomes within each DI-Test condition
had no significant main effect on reciprocity. Figure 5 shows the
estimated marginal mean proportion of blue-card choices after
cooperative and uncooperative interactions for participants who
did and did not receive information about monetary outcome.
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study support the main hypotheses
(hypothesis 1): Despite disadvantageous inequity, the
participants cooperated under DI-Test conditions in a
similar proportion that the computer was programmed to
cooperate under prior conditions. That is, choices in the DI-Test
followed a reciprocal cooperation strategy: After interacting
with a cooperative computer (CI), the participants were also
cooperative, and after interacting with an uncooperative
computer (UI), the participants were also not cooperative.
This reciprocal cooperation strategy was observed regardless of
conditions CI and UI order of presentation. As far as we know,
this is the first study that clearly shows how reciprocity can
alter aversion to disadvantageous inequity in a within-subject
design. Our data suggest that the same participant may be or
may be not averse to disadvantageous inequity due to recent past
cooperative history.
These data support the hypothesis that by interacting multiple
times, participants have the possibility to learn about their
partner’s choices and modulate their behavior accordingly in
future interactions, as suggested by Baker and Rachlin (2001).
Thus, a well-controlled experimental history of social interaction
that involves different magnitudes of gains (i.e., more or fewer
points for the participant in CI and UI interactions conditions
affected the participants’ choices under subsequent conditions,
a result that is consistent with the literature on the effects of a
history of reinforcement (and punishment) on non-social (e.g.,
Sidman, 1960; Galizio, 1979; Freeman and Lattal, 1992; Okouchi,
1999) and social (e.g., Mithaug, 1969; Buskit and Morgan, 1987;
Spiga et al., 1992; Abreu-Rodrigues et al., 2002) situations. Results
replicated findings in children (e.g., Keil et al., 2017; Smith
et al., 2017; Vaish et al., 2018) and adults (e.g., Ribes-Iñesta
et al., 2010; Avalos et al., 2015), indicating that participants
are more cooperative in a test condition after being previously
exposed to cooperation. Moreover, results suggest that under
the present experimental conditions, the interaction of successful
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 July 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 628425
Suarez et al. Reciprocity and Inequity Aversion
cooperation between two individuals may cumulatively increase
the likelihood that a particular individual will act in a way that
produces DI for himself/herself. These data may be consistent
with the general proposition of Tomasello et al. (2005) about the
ability of humans to share intentions in cooperative tasks. The
probability of future interactions and their role in cooperation
can be seen as a byproduct of experience in which learning about
another’s intention to be cooperative or uncooperative.
We also asked whether information about the value of the
outcomes (points alone or points exchangeable for money) would
affect levels of inequity aversion during DI-Test conditions
(hypothesis 2). Our data show no significant difference between
aversion to inequity and information about experiment outcome.
These results contradict studies that have investigated whether
the nature of earnings (points, money, candy, toys) affected
participants’ choices (Harbaugh et al., 2001; Blake and Rand,
2010; Salgado et al., 2011). One possible explanation for the
inconsistency across studies is that the influence of the history of
successful or unsuccessful cooperation in CI and UI exceeded the
possible influence of points vs. monetary gains. One alternative
way to investigate differences between points vs. monetary gains
would be to expose participants directly to disadvantageous
inequity without prior experiences. This manipulation would
isolate the effects of points/money from those of cooperative or
non-cooperative interaction and may reveal differential effects of
those outcomes.
Results are also consistent with assertions by Brosnan
(2011) about the relationship between cooperation and inequity
aversion. Her hypothesis states that inequity aversion allows
individuals to evaluate when they should (a) discontinue
interactions with partners who continually accept advantageous
inequity and, thus, benefit more in cooperative situations, (b)
replace such unfair partners with partners who prefer equal
distribution of gains, and (c) encourage future interactions with
equitable partners and/or manage their reputation as a fair
partner by refusing advantageous inequity. For Brosnan, such
strategies can play an important role in long-term cooperative
actions, particularly when unrelated individuals benefit from
reciprocity and mutualism. Importantly, our results show that
interactions can modulate shifts in aversion to disadvantageous
inequity and reciprocal cooperation within the length of an
experimental session.
Several experimental studies of inequity aversion showed
that non-human primates (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), babies
(Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011), very young children (LoBue
et al., 2011), and adolescents and adults (Blake et al., 2014, 2015a;
Corbit et al., 2017) refused disadvantageous distributions. In
the study by Corbit et al. (2017), for example, children refused
to receive more than others after a cooperative interaction.
In contrast to the present results, however, they also refused
disadvantageous distributions of gains. Such differences may be
attributable to the type of task and specific experimental design.
In the present study, we could specify the reciprocal relationship
that was established between the participants. In Corbit et al.’s
(2017) study, different experimental tasks were used (a task prior
to the situation of inequity and the Inequity Game). In the
present study, with the same experimental task across conditions,
it was possible to evaluate whether the participants’ choices were
reciprocal to the confederate’s choices or not. Thus, our results
highlight the importance of considering reciprocal cooperation
and aversion to inequity as complementary phenomena.
Results can also be analyzed through a theory of conformity.
Although individuals seek to maximize earnings in social
interactions, choosing the most used strategy (i.e., conformity)
can guarantee minimal payoffs at group average levels. In
addition, the acceptance of the group in relation to one’s choice
can function as a social reinforcer for conformity, and a sense of
belonging (Szolnoki and Perc, 2015). Szolnoki and Perc (2015)
argue that individuals may conform to others in order to select
the most promising strategies for future interaction within the
group. Regarding the results presented here, conformity may
have played a role in the influence of computer cooperative
strategies during CI and UI over participant’s choices in DI-Test.
Future research may study the relationship between aversion to
inequity and conformity by designing experimental tasks where
more than two participants exert influence over each other, and
as part of a group.
Research on reciprocity has created interesting discussions
about the evolution of cooperation and has contributed to
the design of quantitative models of social behavior and
cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). The learning
experience may interact with all of these factors. Investigations
of interactions between them may lead to a better understanding
of the ways in which cooperation influences future interactions.
This is an important issue to be explored because such
discussions may allow the reconciliation of whether there is
a genetic disposition to behave in a cooperative and altruistic
manner (e.g., Warneken, 2016) based on personal experiences
among individuals. Differences in ontogeny that are caused by
cultural aspects may be related to the notion of cultural learning
(e.g., Tomasello, 2016). An essential aspect of cultural learning is
related to learning about others behavior.
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